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Abstract
A series of recent papers have investigated the nature of trading and sorting induced by
the dynamic price mechanism in a competitive durable good market with adverse selection and
exogenous entry of traders over time. These models are dynamic versions of Akerlof’s (1970)
seminal work. The general set up consist of identical cohorts of durable goods, whose quality is
known only to potential sellers, enter the market over time and a common result is that there
exists a cyclical equilibrium where all goods are traded within a finite number of periods after
entry. Market failure is reflected in the relationship between product quality (and product relia-
bility) and the length of waiting time before trade as well as on the relationship between average
price decline and extent of trade of used goods. Based on a unique 9-month dataset collected
from Amazon’ secondary market across multiple countries, and multiple product categories we
provide empirical evidence of trade patterns and the presence of adverse selection. We show
how used good quality and product reliability affect resale turnaround times in an electronic sec-
ondary market. We find some empirical evidence that is consistent with theoretical predictions
existing in the literature.
1 Introduction
Information technology reduces the search and transaction costs for buyers and sellers to locate and
trade products, and can thereby facilitate the creation of technology-mediated electronic exchanges
(Ghose et al. 2005). These exchanges allow sellers to easily reach a worldwide market and allow
buyers to easily locate items that frequently would be unavailable in traditional physical stores.
Consumer-to-consumer exchanges represent one prominent area where the low search and transac-
tions costs in IT-enabled markets have enabled product exchanges that would not have been viable
in a comparable brick-and-mortar environment. For example, Amazon.com has recently starting
listing exchanges for used products, such as books, sold by individual customers along-side listings
for Amazon’s new products.
The sale of used products has been around for a long time in physical markets. However,
electronic exchanges alter the scale and scope of what is possible with regard to the sale of used
products. For example, in a physical environment new and used books are typically sold in separate
brick-and-mortar stores, raising search costs for customers who wish to compare prices between the
two outlets. Further, brick-and-mortar used bookstores have limited inventory-holding capacity,
which makes it difficult to stock a full range of new and used titles in the presence of customers
with heterogeneous preferences toward used offerings. In contrast in Internet exchanges, search
costs to compare prices for new and used goods are much lower than in brick-and-mortar stores.
This is in part because used goods can be listed side-by-side with new books either by retailers
(e.g., Amazon.com) or by shopping agents (e.g., BizRate.com). Likewise, Internet retailers do not
face the same geographical or physical constraints as physical retailers do. Thus, these retailers
can attract buyers from across the world and can add additional listings to their book offerings at
a very low cost, and in most cases don’t even have to take possession of the products.1
Although e-commerce provides dominant search means as far as standardized product and price
1For example, Amazon.com allows anyone wishing to sell a used good to list his or her product on Amazon’s
site. There is no listing fee, but if the good sells Amazon pays the seller $2.26 to cover their shipping fees and takes
between 6-15% commission on the sale of the item plus $1.
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information is concerned, given the diversity in sellers’or products’ characteristics such standard-
ization may not be possible. Whereas “digital” attributes ( such as description, size, etc.) can be
communicated easily in electronic markets, “non-digital” attributes (product condition, product
quality and seller integrity) are amenable to noise and manipulation. This has the potential to
reinforce the adverse selection problem. Adverse selection equilibria exist due to information asym-
metry stemming from the inobservability of quality signals in markets for experience goods. This
informational asymmetry is associated with both an individual seller’s personal characteristic (rep-
utation) as well as the product’s self-reported quality in an electronic market environment. Choi et
al. (1997) therefore conclude that the future of the internet “may depend on how non-technological
but fundamentally economic issues as the lemons problem are solved.” In many respects, an elec-
tronic secondary market - although predominantly involving consumer-to-consumer trade - provides
a prime example for investigating the impact of private seller information on retailing in experience
goods.
Our main objective is to investigate trade patterns (turnaround times and price premiums) in
electronic secondary markets such as those hosted by Amazon as a function of direct and indirect
quality indicators such as used good quality and product reliability. This can shed light on the extent
of adverse selection in such markets. While much work in this domain has been done in the context
of used cars, prior work has primarily focussed on adverse selection in static markets. This paper
draws results from recent literature on dynamic and decentralized markets of durable goods.
We to do this for a wide variety of goods which are transacted on the US site of Amazon, using
a panel dataset that we have been collecting for the past 9 months from Amazon.com. Broadly,
they fall under 3 categories: (i) Information Goods (such as Books, CDs, DVDs and Consumer
Software), (ii) Computers (Printers, Laptops, and Desktops), and (iii) Electronics (Audio, Video
and Digital Cameras). This product set provides a nice mix of homogenous and heterogenous
products (heterogenous in the significance of the used good quality) which enable us to isolate the
impact of the two sources of quality uncertainty: seller-specific characteristics and product-specific
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characteristics. Electronics goods also have high depreciation rates as measured by the steep price
decline in the used markets and this feature helps us test another prediction based on the theoretical
framework.
We also analyze whether trade patterns in used goods vary from those in the US, across the
following four countries: UK, Canada, Germany, and France for each of the following categories:
Books, CDs, and DVDs, using a wider dataset collected from the international sites of Amazon.2
These markets differ widely in terms of adoption of electronic secondary markets. This analysis
helps determine how much of a trading premium (in terms of turnaround times and price premiums),
does seller reputation fetch across these online markets. Further, it also highlights the relative
attractiveness of these emerging markets from the retailer’s point of view.
1.1 Prior Literature
According to Akerlof (1970), low-quality goods can drive out high-quality goods in the presence
of information asymmetries. Basically, if true quality is not observable at the time of transaction,
sellers of high quality goods have little incentive to transact at discounted prices that must reflect
the average quality of goods traded. As sellers with high-quality goods leave the market, both price
and average quality spiral downward, leaving only “lemons” (i.e., low-quality goods) in the market.
Consequently, when valuations depend on quality of goods and the market is static, market failure
manifests itself in the fact that higher quality goods cannot be traded despite the potential gains
from trade.
However, evidence of the insights contained in Akerlof’s (1970) seminal work are mixed and
inconclusive in contemporary durable goods markets. Bond (1984) finds weak evidence of adverse
selection among older trucks only. Genesove (1993) finds only slight evidence of adverse selection
in dealer auction markets for used cars. Fabel and Lehmann (2000) and Emons and Sheldon (2002)
find stronger support for the existence of adverse selection in used automobile markets. Dewan and
2At the time our data was being collected, the other products are not being sold on the international sites of
Amazon.
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Hsu (2004) find evidence of adverse selection in collectible stamps by comparing data from Ebay
with that of Michael Rogers.
Our work is also related to the growing stream of literature on electronic secondary markets
which have studied issues on a variety of topics such as their impact on an information goods
supply chain (Ghose, Telang and Krishnan 2005), estimating product cannibalization and social
welfare (Ghose, Smith and Telang 2005) and in determining various reputation dimensions (Ghose,
Ipeirotis and Sundararajan 2005).
2 Analytical Framework
2.1 Theory
According to predictions from recent theory (Stolyarov 2002, Blouin 2003, Janssen and Karamychev
2003, Janssen and Roy 2004), in a dynamic market for durable goods wherein goods are continuously
traded, there exist equilibria where all sellers, no matter how high the quality of their good, may
be able to trade in finite time. Amazon’s used good market is an example of a decentralized
market. Despite the fact that some indicators like the seller’s self-reported product quality and
seller reputation rating is available to buyers, information asymmetries are likely in electronic
markets because buyers and sellers are separated by time and space. Hence, in such used durable
good markets, adverse selection caused by asymmetric information manifests itself in the fact that
sellers with relatively high quality goods need to wait longer than sellers of low quality goods, in
order to successfully complete a trade.
When used goods trade is decentralized (such as in Amazon’s used good market where we have
random matching of agents in pairs), (i) transactions need not occur at the same price, and (ii)
both price and time are adjustment mechanisms (Blouin 2003). Basically, a seller in a decentralized
market (or an auctionneerless market) faces a tradeoff: if he quotes a high rather than a low price,
he obtains a higher payoff if he were able to sell the item. However, he is likely to have to wait
longer to find a buyer willing to pay this price. How a seller responds to this tradeoff depends on
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his reservation price, which in turn depends on the quality of the good that he is selling. So high-
quality and low-quality sellers, despite possibly having the same discount factor, do not account
for time in the same way in their utility function. High-quality sellers are willing to wait longer to
get a higher price. At the market level, this exhibits itself by low-quality items selling earlier than
high-quality items. The natural outcome is that there is an accumulation of higher quality sellers in
the market place, relative to lower quality sellers. Essentially, the proportion of high-quality items
among those offered reaches a level such that a buyer’s willingness to pay exceeds a high-quality
seller’s reservation price.
In the context of durable goods, what drives high quality sellers to quote a higher price is
the residual (or use) value of the good. The extent of value sellers derive from the good while it
is waiting to be sold increases in its quality. Hence, they are willing to list it a higher price if
has undergone little or no degradation (high quality good). Inderst and Muller (2003) consider a
search market for durable goods where sellers have private information about the goods quality.
In contrast to the standard (static) analysis, they show that in equilibrium goods of different
qualities sell at different prices. To ensure incentive compatibility, high-quality goods circulate
longer than low-quality goods. They also compare the market outcome with the benchmark of
complete information, and find that for a large range of parameter values the outcomes under
complete and private information coincide. This is important from our point of view of our analysis,
since arguably electronic markets provide various means of reducing the information asymmetry
between buyers and sellers. For instance, a seller’s transaction history as observed from the feedback
system common in secondary markets such as Amazon and other indirect quality indicators can
alleviate some of the lemons’ problem but not get rid of it completely.
Recent theoretical work has also shown that the asymmetric distribution of information about
quality is reflected in the degradation rates and trading intensities of used products. Porter and
Sattler (1999) report that unreliable vehicles are traded more frequently. There is also evidence
that reliable vehicles are traded later in life. According to Porter and Sattler (1999), two makes
7
with the highest reliability are Honda and Toyota. The median selling age for a used Honda or
Toyota is 7.1 years. In contrast, the median selling age for a Pontiac or a GM car, two of the less
reliable makes, is 6.1 years. They also find that “the rate of decline of a used car model’s prices
is negatively and significantly correlated with the length of ownership tenure”. However, this is in
direct contrast to the findings of Hendel and Lizzeri (1999). They consider a simple model with
two brands of two-period-lived cars and show that if the brand that deteriorates faster has a larger
volume of trade, then the steeper price decline can be explained by faster depreciation. On the other
hand, if the brand that has a steeper price decline has a lower volume of trade, then this points
to evidence of adverse selection. Other related work includes Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) who show
that leasing, by increasing the average quality of durable goods transacted in used markets, may
mitigate the consequences of adverse selection. Gilligan (2004) finds a direct relationship between
depreciation and trading volume for used aircraft models with relatively high lease rates. Finally,
prior work (Porter and Sattler 1999, Stolyarov 2002) also show that goods that depreciate faster
as reflected by a steeper price decline in the used good prices, are traded more frequently.
A possible theory which might explain the differences in turnaround times independent of prod-
uct qualities is that of consumer search costs and how information environments affect consumer
choice. On the internet, the heterogeneity in search costs can arise, for example, from the dif-
ferences in willingness to scroll down the screen (Brynjolfsson, Dick and Smith 2004). We can
expect consumers to find it costly to scroll down the screen in order to observe all offers, since
this involves waiting time and cognitive effort for evaluating multiple offers. Thus, consumers who
inspect higher screens only and buy accordingly, chose to do so because they might care about only
price, given high search costs. Whereas those consumers who inspect lower screens might to do so
since they care about non-price factors such as product quality and seller characteristics. However,
this price-effect is mediated by the fact that on Amazon’s used good market, even though the offers
are arranged in order of increasing price as one scrolls down the screen, the listings are clustered
based on the product’s condition. The high quality categories are on the higher screens followed
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by lower quality categories on lower screens. Hence, from the consumer’ point of view, we have
two countervailing effects from qualities and prices which alleviates the net impact on turnaround
times from search costs related factors. Nevertheless, for the sake of robustness, we account of the
position of any given used offer on the screen by controlling for it.
2.2 Empirical Implications
The theoretical results from prior work lead to the following two testable predictions for demon-
strating the presence of adverse selection in the market:
1. All else constant, goods that are more reliable, are traded faster than goods that are less
reliable, in a used good market.
2. All else constant, lower quality goods are traded faster than higher quality goods, in a used
good market.
3. All else constant, products that have an increasingly convex price decline in the used good
market, are traded less frequently than those which have a less steeper price decline.
In order to empirically test these hypotheses, we need to find the time for which goods circulate
in the used market. Hence, we need information on the turnaround time of used products from our
data. This implies that we need information on which used good of what quality sold on which
date (say, day Y) after being listed on day X. That is, we need to know how many types of used
goods of different conditions were available on a given day X and how many types of those goods
were sold on a given date Y. If after controlling for seller reputation (which includes both their
numeric feedback ratings and the total number of transactions conducted over their lifetime), we
find that low quality goods sold at a faster rate than high quality goods after being listed on the
same date X, that implies that there is some adverse selection going on in the marketplace. Thus,
based on the turnaround time(listing time minus selling time) at which high quality goods were
sold versus low quality goods, we expect to find some (either strong or weak) evidence of adverse
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selection from the data. This will also enable us to identify the impact of adverse selection due to
“delayed sales” faced by high quality sellers. Additionally to test the third hypothesis, we also need
information on the selling prices of the different used goods. Our objective will be to determine
the directional relationship between the sale price and the turnaround time.
One way to do this is to categorize goods on the basis of adverse selection a priori. For instance,
for electronic items we can classify goods a priori as being “more reliable” or “less reliable” based
on their reliability index.3 In other words, we can compare the turnaround time or propensity for
sale across goods in a specific product category, after deciding beforehand which goods face higher
costs from asymmetric information between buyers and sellers.
In order to check the impact of reliability on used good turnaround times, we use ratings
from ConsumerReports.org and other auxillary sources such as CNET to classify the products
a priori. We have done this for the following categories: Digital Cameras, Cellular Phones and
Electronic appliances. For instance, within the sub-category of Plasma TVs in the Electronics
category, Panasonic has the highest rating, followed by Sony and Phillips. Similarly, within the
digital cameras, Canon and Fujifilm have the highest ratings while Casio and Pentax have lower
ratings. See the Appendix for a screenshot of a reliability report for Desktops and Laptops. Table
1 below provides a summary of the reliability ratings for different product categories.
Rank Audio Video Dig. Cameras Desktops Laptops PDAs
1 Sony Panasonic Sony Apple Toshiba Palm
2 Panasonic Sony Panasonic Sony IBM Asus
3 Apple Phillips Canon Dell Apple HP
4 Phillips Samsung Olympus eMachines Sony Dell
5 Toshiba Sharp Fuji IBM Dell Sony
6 Casio Casio HP HP
7 Nikon Compaq Gateway
8 Kodak Gateway Compaq
9 Pentax
Table 1: Reliability ranks for different products in our dataset as obtained from Consumer Reports
3As another example, paperback books are likely to face greater adverse selection than hardcover books (since
it’s easier to damage a paperback book). Then, between paperbacks and hardcover books, higher priced paperbacks
should take longer to sell than higher priced hardcover.
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3 Data Description
To analyze the research questions outlined above, we have compiled a market-level data set on a
cross-section of used good sellers, encompassing several different categories. These resellers include
both established firms known as Pro-Merchants on Amazon as well as individual consumers who
engage in sporadic selling. My data is compiled from publicly available information on used product
listings at Amazon.com. The data was gathered using automated Java scripts to access and parse
HTML and XML pages downloaded from the retailer. The data is from the 9 month period of
January to August 2005, and is still ongoing. The dataset consists of many different goods which
are transacted on Amazon. Broadly it consists of information goods such as Books, CDs, DVDs and
software as well as electronic goods such as PDAs, audio & video electronics and digital cameras.
All of these products are available on the used marketplaces of Amazon USA.
On the international front however, we only have data on Books, CDs, and DVDs since these
categories form the bulk of the products being sold internationally. Using Amazon’s Web-services
program, one can download data feeds from Amazon in XML (extensible markup language) format.
They first started this on the U.S. website and then gradually extended this to Canada, U.K. France,
and Germany. This enables me to capture a very rich dataset across countries as shown in the Table
2 below.
Products Countries
Books USA, UK, Canada, Germany, France
CDs USA, UK, Canada, Germany, France




Handhelds and PDAs USA
Audio & Video USA
Table 2: List of products available on the secondary market of Amazon in early 2005 across coun-
tries.
The Book panel consists of 120 individual titles drawn from across different categories such as
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NY Times best sellers, former NY Times bestsellers, new and upcoming, best selling textbooks
(from facultyonline.cm best seller list) and random books(randomly selected from all Amazon.com
titles listed in the “browse” section (which we believe includes all titles offered for sale by Amazon).
We also kept a balance of paperbacks and hardcover books in our sample. The CD and DVD panel
also consisted of a 120 unique titles from current best sellers, former best sellers and random ones.
During the process of selecting our sample, we ensured that each of these titles is available for sale
in the corresponding used markets of the other 4 countries. To avoid any biases from heterogenous
versions or editions, we used the same ISBN or ASIN number to locate products across countries.
The software panel includes 280 individual software titles, with an equal number of prod-
ucts from each of five major categories: Business/Productivity, Graphics, Development, Secu-
rity/Utilities and Operating Systems3. Software products provide an excellent environment to test
our theory on price premiums and reputation since they form present a big contrast to some of our
other product categories. Basically, they are most consistent with uniform product quality.
For each of the products in the electronic devices category such as computers (laptops and
desktops), digital cameras, Handhelds and PDAs our sample set consist of 200 unique ASINs
comprising of a mix of top-100 best selling products (based on Amazon’s sales rank which acts a
proxy for sales) and randomly selected products from each category. The selection of random goods
was done across the major brands in each category to ensure a representative sample across firms.
This was done to ensure that we don’t have an over-representation of reliable or unreliable brands
in each category.
These electronic products provide a robust environment to test our theory of reliability rankings
and turnaround times because of the overwhelming high number of “high quality” goods (based on
the product condition) that are sold on the used good market. For example, the proportion of new
goods sold on the secondary market for digital cameras is about 87 %. Similarly, the proportion of
“high quality” goods sold on the used market for Handhelds and PDAs is about 82 %. This then
helps us isolate the impact of reliability from used good quality.
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From the new good (primary market), we collect data on the new good prices charged by
Amazon, the date the product was released into the market, the average customer rating for the
product and number of reviewers based on which the average rating was displayed. This information
is useful for formulating various control variables. From the secondary (used good) market for each
sample, we collect data on the used good listing date, the listing price, characteristics of the seller
listing the used good (average reputation rating and transaction feedback history), and the good’s
self-reported quality. The product condition is self-reported by the seller and can be either “New”,
“Like New,” “ refurbished”, “Very Good,” “Good,” or “Acceptable”.4 The reputation data from
Amazon’s marketplace, includes a summary of scores (or ratings) given to the seller by buyers who
have completed transactions with the seller in the past. The ratings are provided on a scale of
1− 5 stars. The number of stars is measure of the reported experiences of prior buyers with each
seller. All ratings <= 2 are denoted as negative whereas all ratings >= 4 are denoted as positive.
Thus, a rating of 3 is categorized as a neutral rating. These ratings are averaged to give an overall
feedback rating.
In addition to an average over all scores obtained over the seller’s life time, Amazon also reports
an average of scores obtained more recently (30 days, 90 days and 365 days, for example) for each
of the three categories: positive, neutral and negative. Thus, we are able to see how a seller’s
feedback profile has changed over time. This is important to investigate whether the presence of
seller reputation (quality in terms of average rating and quantity in terms of total lifetime ratings)
affect the used price at which the good was sold, and the probability of a used good sale in terms
of how fast the turnaround time is after being listed.
Our sellers consist of both individuals and larger well established sellers known as Pro Merchants.
An example of a Pro-Merchant is a firm like Office Depot and J&R, who despite being Amazon’s
competitors, are allowed to sell products on its marketplace. This is because Amazon makes money
through the listing fees ($ 0.99 per listing) as well as via the used good commission fees (which is
4There is also a category called “Unacceptable”, but in our dataset we do not find any used good in this category.
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a percentage of the used good selling price ranging between 6 and 15%.) Amazon.com waives the
$0.99 fee for “Pro Merchant Subscribers.” Pro Merchant Subscribers are charged $19.99 per month
for membership.
Importantly, we are able to formulate a dataset of used product sales using Amazon.com’s
XML data feed for website. In early 2004, Amazon added a new variable to their XML data feed
to developers, allowing developers to obtain accurate measures of their used good sales. Basically,
Amazon added a unique product identifier, known as the Listing ID for each product listed in the
used book market. Similarly each seller is also given a unique Seller ID by Amazon. By observing
when a product is listed and when its listing disappears, we are able to infer when a transaction
actually takes place. Basically, we can infer that a sale has occurred when a product identifier that
appeared in the previous data collection period does not appear in the current collection period’s
XML listings. This also enables us to compute the number of transactions any given seller has
successfully completed.5 This technique to infer sales from Amazon’s used market has also been
used in a recent stream of emerging work (Ghose, Smith and Telang 2005, Ghose, Ipeirotis and
Sundararajan 2005)
We collected this marketplace sales data once every 8 hours for all titles. From the XML based
Seller and Listing IDs, we can infer the price at which the good was sold, the date on which the
good was sold, all relevant details for competing offers, the number of such used good listed and
sold. From the primary market, Iwe also have the new good price of that good, along with when the
product was released in the market. Depending on the product category, Amazon provides between
four and five different conditions (or quality) levels of used goods. Our data includes all used good
offers on a given date for each condition. For goods such as books, CDs, DVDs and software
there are 4 possible used good quality levels (Like New, Very Good, Good and Acceptable) that
5Amazon claims on its site that for their Pro Merchant sellers, their listings will remain on the site indefinitely
until they are sold. For individual sellers, if the item doesn’t sell within 60 days, the listing is closed and an email is
sent to the seller with instructions about how to relist your item. In our dataset, we see no unusual rise in “sales”
around the 60 day mark. Therefore, we include all inferred sales in our analysis regardless of the number of days
before a sale occurs. We have also run the regressions after removing all imputed sales after exactly 60 days. This
did not lead to any appreciable change in results.
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resellers can classify them as. For most other categories of products such as electronic appliances
and devices, Amazon allows resellers to classify their listings into 5 different used good qualities
(Like New, Refurbished, Very Good, Good and Acceptable).
Given that we are able to observe all Listing IDs and Seller IDs during the course of a product’s
listing life-cycle (that is from the time the product was first listed till the time it was sold), we are
able to observe data of all the competitors for any given seller. Thus we are able to impute com-
petitors’ prices, competitors’ ratings over different time periods, competitors’ product condition,
and the price premium. We define Price Premium in two ways: First, as the difference in the sale
price over the second highest price offered and second as the difference in the sale price and the
average of all other competing prices, at the time the product was sold. From this variable, we also
computed the percentage price premium which is the ratio of the price premium to the sale price.
4 Empirical Framework
4.1 Empirical Estimations
We start by running OLS regressions with fixed effects to infer the “turnaround-time premiums”
that a product’s condition and other seller characteristics fetch in the electronic secondary market.
This also gives us an economic measure of the probability of a sale given a seller’s numeric rating.6
In order to avoid omitted variables bias (Luckling-Reiley et al. 2000), we use the saleprice variable
in our regressions. A description of variables used in the regressions is given in Table 3. To test
our first hypothesis of the impact of product quality on turnaround times in the used good market,
we estimate models of the following form:
Ln(Time)pt = δ Ln(SalePrice) + λ1 Ln(SRating)pt + λ2 Ln(SLife)pt +
λ3 Ln(PCondition)pt + φ Ln(X)pt + pt (1)
6An alternate way of controlling for the different categories of a specific good for sale is to use dummy variables
to indicate broad category classes. These dummies can serve as a proxy for the book value of a product.
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Variable Description
Sale Price Transaction Price
Time Time difference between a listing and its sale.
SRating Seller’s average numeric reputation.
PCondition Product condition as listed by the Seller.
SLife (The number of ratings the seller has over its life+1).
Offer Position Position of the used good offer on the screen.
Number of Sellers Number of competing sellers at nay given time for any given product.
Used Offers Number of competing used good offers listed at any given time for a specific product.
Reliability Product reliability rankings imputed from Consumer Reports.
PricePremium Difference between sale price and each competing price.
AvgPremium Difference between sale price and the average of all competing prices.
Table 3: Description of Variables
where, p and t index product and date. The dependant variable is the log of the turnaround-time.
We also include seller fixed effects and run the OLS regressions. The independent variables are
the seller’s rating, the number of lifetime ratings of the seller, the condition of the used product
that was sold, and a vector of other control variables (X). Our control variables include the log of
the new product price (PAmazon), log of average customer review rating (Review) and the log of
the time since the product was released (Datediff ). We include a control variable (Offer Position)
which indicates the relative position of the used good offer on the webpage. As explained earlier
in the Introduction, the purpose of introducing this variable is to control for the differential search
costs that consumers might have while searching across different screens. We also estimate models
which includes counts of positive, neutral and negative feedback for sellers. We progressively
introduce new reputation variables by disaggregating the Slife variable into different time periods
(total transactions over 30 days, 90 days, 365 days and lifetime), for each of the three rating
categories(positive, neutral and negative). We do not find any significant change in estimates. We
also use the Number of sellers and Number of offers since each seller can have multiple used offers
16
for listing) as additional control variables.
To test our hypothesis about the reliability of products and its impact on their turnaround time
from listing to sale on the used market, we estimate models of the following form:
Ln(Time)st = δ Ln(SalePrice) + λ1 Ln(SRating)st + λ2 Ln(SLife)st +
λ3 Ln(PCondition)st + λ4 Ln(Reliability)st + φ Ln(X)st + st (2)
where, s and t index seller and date. The dependant variable is the Log of Time. Reliability is a
numerical variable that takes the value from 1-i depending on the reliability ranking of the product
as shown in Table 1, with 1 being the least reliable and i being the most reliable product. The
value of i depends on the availability of the ratings information since we do not have uniform
ratings information for all products.7 We also estimate OLS regressions without seller fixed effects
and find directionally similar results for the coefficient on reliability for these devices. The control
variables used in models based on equation 2 are similar to those used in estimating models similar
to equation 1.
Finally, we analyze the impact of a seller’s reputation on price premium by estimating models
of the form:
Ln(PricePremium)st = δ Ln(SalePrice) + λ Ln(SRating)st + η Ln(SLife)st +
κ Ln(SCondition)st + φ Ln(X)st + st (3)
where, s and t index seller and date. The dependant variable is the log of the price premium. The
OLS regressions include both product and seller fixed effects. We calculate the Price Premium
variable in a number of ways. First, we take the difference of the sale price with that of the
nearest competing price at the time the product was sold. We calculate another variant of the
Price Premium by taking the difference of the sale price and the average posted prices of all the
competing sellers at the time of sale. It is also possible that since the range of prices of the
7For some products we have the top 9 most reliable brands while for others we have the top 5 most reliable brands.
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products in our sample are fairly large, the absolute price of product plays a role in the extent to
which buyers are concerned about the price differences between sellers. Hence, we also construct a
new variable, PPRatio which is simply the ratio of the Price Premium to the sale price. Results
from all regressions yield qualitatively similar results.
We also estimate separate models which includes counts of positive, neutral and negative feed-
back for sellers. We progressively introducing new reputation variables by disaggregating the Slife
variable into different time periods (total transactions over 30 days, 90 days, 365 days and lifetime),
for each of the three rating categories(positive, neutral and negative). A general finding among
electronic items is that positive feedback over 90 days, 365 days and a seller’s lifetime increases
price premium, while positive feedback over 30 days has no statistically significant impact. On the
other hand negative feedback obtained over all four time frames has a statistically significant effect
on price premium. Further, neutral feedback also tends to have a negative effect
It is also important to mention that in very few of the successful transactions do we find
consumers buying the used good with the lowest price. Despite the underlying homogeneity in
prices, it seems that the final bundle of product and seller characteristics is viewed as being a
heterogenous product. Given the extent of diversity in seller characteristics, consumers care more
about overall utility from buying the final bundled product. Hence, besides price other factors,
both direct and indirect, also play a role in transactions.
4.2 Estimates
We present the estimates in Tables 4, 5, and 6. In table (4), we present the main estimates for
the book category across three countries.8 For different categories across different countries, we
find that the coefficient of Product Condition in equation (1) is positive implying that an increase
in the quality of the used good leads to a increase in the turnaround time of the product in the
marketplace. This finding corroborates our first hypothesis that high quality goods take longer
time to sell than low quality goods. The only exception was that of France where we found that
8For brevity we have omitted the estimates for other product categories.
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Variable (Estimates: Germany) (Estimates: Canada) (Estimates: France)
Constant 18.21∗∗∗ (0.14) 15.71∗∗∗ (0.14) 54.1∗∗∗ (0.98)
Ln[SalePrice] 0.51∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.359∗∗∗ (0.011) −0.59∗∗(0.04)
Ln[SRating] −5.1∗∗∗ (0.087) −2.48∗∗∗ (0.09) −7.71∗∗∗ (0.24)
Ln[SLife] 0.007∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.099∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.026∗∗∗ (0.004)
Ln[Condition] 0.84∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.58∗∗∗(0.1) −0.23∗∗(0.051)
Table 4: The effect of product and seller characteristics on turnaround time for books in Germany,
Canada and France. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Log of
Time. ***, ** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.
the coefficient was negative for books. 9
Interestingly, we found that the impact of an increase in total transactions is not always positive
on turnaround times as noted for audio and video products, books, cellular phones and computers.
This maybe due to a widespread heterogeneity in size of the sellers, given the mix of professional
firms and ordinary sellers in the marketplace. To investigate this further, we created three dummy
variables: Life1000, Life 10000 and LifeAll which take the values of 0 or 1 depending on whether
the seller has between 1 and 1000 transactions, between 1000− 10000 transactions and more than
10000 transactions. We find that for smaller size sellers, the increase in transactions has mixed
impact on turnaround times and price premiums where as for larger sellers, the impact of an
increase in total transactions on these trading premiums is always positive.
Next we investigate the impact of product reliability on turnaround times and highlight two
directionally opposite results. We present our estimates for the various audio/ video products and
digital cameras in Table 7. The coefficient of reliability is negative for Audio/Video products;
this implies that less reliable products take more time to sell leading to a lower volume of trade.
Interestingly, this is consistent with the findings of Porter and Sattler (1999), but in contrast to
the results of Hendel and Lizzeri (1999). On the other hand, the coefficient is positive for digital
9We also segregate our books into paperback and hardcover and estimate the impact of product condition on
turnaround times. We find directionally similar results.
19
Variable (Estimates: Digital Cameras) (Estimates: Handhelds/PDAs)
Constant 12.36∗∗∗ (0.23) 9.12∗∗∗ (0.17)
Ln[SalePrice] 0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.65∗∗∗ (0.03)
Ln[SRating] −0.55∗∗∗ (0.028) −0.08∗ (0.04)
Ln[SLife] 0.04∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.06∗∗∗ (0.003)
Ln[Condition] 1.1∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.64∗∗∗(0.02)
Table 5: The effect of product and seller characteristics on turnaround time for various electronic
devices in the US market. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is
Log of Time . ***, ** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.
Variable Estimates: Computers (Estimates: Audio/Video)
Constant 11.04∗∗∗ (0.06) 12.87∗∗∗(0.12)
Ln[SalePrice] 0.07∗∗∗(0.006) 0.028∗(0.01)
Ln[SRating] −0.56∗∗∗ (0.039) −0.97∗∗∗(0.28)
Ln[SLife] −0.039∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.044∗∗∗(0.002)
Ln[Condition] 1.89∗∗∗ (0.019) 1.01∗∗∗(0.017)
Table 6: The effect of product and seller characteristics on turnaround time for computers. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Log of Time . ***, ** and * denote
significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.
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Variable Estimate:Audio/Video Estimates: Digital Cameras
Constant 12.48∗∗∗ (0.06) 9.26∗∗∗(0.17)
Ln[SalePrice] 0.001(0.005) 0.14∗∗∗(0.011)
Ln[SRating] −1.01∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.04(0.09)
Ln[SLife] 0.08∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.78∗∗∗(0.015)
Ln[Condition] 1.27∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.096∗∗∗(0.27)
Ln[Reliabilty] −0.04∗∗∗(0.008) 0.09∗∗∗(0.012)
Table 7: The effect of reliability ranking on turnaround time for audio/video products and digital
cameras. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Log of Time . ***,
** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.
cameras implying that more reliable products take longer time to trade, and consequently, the
volume of trade over a finite period of time will be lower. This finding is consistent with the
findings of Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), but in contrast to the results of Porter and Sattler (1999).
Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) point out that depreciation and adverse selection lead to countervail-
ing effects on trade volumes and resale frequencies. In particular, they show that when more reliable
products have lower volumes of trade, it indicates the existence of adverse selection, whereas when
less reliable products have lower trade volumes, that is driven by the differences in depreciation
rates. Thus, our paper provides some empirical evidence of the existence of the lemons’ problem
among digital cameras, in dynamic and decentralized versions of electronic secondary markets.
Finally, to test our third hypothesis we formulate the variable “Price Decline” which is the ratio of
the “Sale Price” to “ New Price”. This ratio measure the average price decline in the used good
from the price of a new version of the same product and is thus a measure of the residual value of
the product. We point out that the coefficient of the independent variable Price Decline is positive
for digital cameras when the dependent variable is Log of Time. Since this implies that an increase
in the extent of price decline for a used good leads to a increase in the time required for a used
product to sell, we provide partial evidence of our third hypothesis that goods that depreciate more
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quickly as reflected by a steeper decline in their prices on the used market, have the propensity to
be traded less frequently as reflected by a higher waiting time for trade to occur.
Additionally, we also present the estimates that measure the impact of a seller’s reputation on
price-premiums across different categories in Tables 8, 9 and 10. As expected a higher product
condition, higher number of total transactions and a higher seller reputation fetch higher price
premiums for sellers in the secondary market. This holds for both variations in the formulation of
the price premium variable. We next disaggregate the reputation history into positive, negative
and neutral ratings over different time periods. The general finding is that positive ratings have a
positive impact on pricing power whereas neutral and negative have a stronger detrimental effect
on price premiums.10 We thus add to a growing literature on the study of reputation systems
on pricing power. A majority of prior empirical work on this topic has been based on hedonic
regressions of absolute price that view reputation as a product characteristic. But an important
aspect of prior work is that not all of the results are consistent. For example, Kalyanam and
McIntyre (2001) study Palm Pilots and PDAs, and Melnick and Alm (2003) study gold coins, and
each of these studies finds that positive feedback increases prices while negative feedback decreases
prices. A study of collectible coins by Luckling-Reiley et. al. (2000) finds that a 1% increase in
negative feedback leads to a 0.11% decrease in the final bid price. However, Eaton (2002) finds no
effect of positive feedback on the probability of sale or price in his study of electric guitars, and
also finds that negative feedback reduces the probability of sale only for sellers with more than
20 feedback postings; Livingston (2002) finds that sellers with more than 675 positive comments
earn a premium of $45.76, more than 10% of the mean selling price, as compared to new sellers
with no feedback, and does not find that any significant effect of negative feedback. Cabral and
Hortascu (2004) identify a significant effect only after eBay changed in display in 2003 to show the
percentage negative along with the composite score.
10Estimates of the disaggregated variables for software, books and computers, and the aggregate estimates for other
product categories in other countries have directionally similar results. They have been omitted for brevity but are
available from the author upon request.
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Variable Ln[PricePremium] Ln[AvgPremium]
Constant −3.04∗∗∗ (0.56) −7.4∗∗∗ (0.47)
Ln[SalePrice] 0.84∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.74∗∗∗ (0.003)
Ln[SRating] 0.884∗∗∗ (0.402) 3.66∗∗∗ (0.3)
Ln[SLife] 0.089∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.028)
Ln[Condition] 0.189∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.019 (0.15)
∗ significant with p ≤ 0.1
∗∗ significant with p ≤ 0.05
∗∗∗ significant with p ≤ 0.01
Table 8: The effect of product and seller characteristics on pricing power for software in USA.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Log of Price Premium.
Variable Ln[PricePremium] Ln[AvgPremium]
Constant −28.04∗∗∗ (1.78) −17.14∗∗∗ (1.47)
Ln[SalePrice] 5.7∗∗∗ (0.06) 5.47∗∗∗ (0.06)
Ln[SRating] 4.53∗∗∗ (1.16) 4.36∗∗∗ (1.13)
Ln[SLife] 0.07∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.028)
Ln[Condition] 0.2∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.019 (0.015)
∗ significant with p ≤ 0.1
∗∗ significant with p ≤ 0.05
∗∗∗ significant with p ≤ 0.01
Table 9: The effect of product and seller characteristics on pricing power for books in USA. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Log of Price Premium or Log of
Average Price Premium .
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Variable Ln[PricePremium] Ln[AvgPremium]
Constant −12.22∗∗∗ (1.59) −14.01∗∗∗ (1.67)
Ln[SalePrice] 2.18∗∗∗ (0.029) 2.09∗∗∗ (0.026)
Ln[SRating] 4.26∗ ∗ ∗ (1.03) 4.14∗∗∗ (1.02)
Ln[SLife] −0.02(0.01) -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01)
Ln[Condition] 0.11∗∗ (0.05) 0.14∗∗∗(0.025)
∗ significant with p ≤ 0.1
∗∗ significant with p ≤ 0.05
∗∗∗ significant with p ≤ 0.01
Table 10: The effect of product and seller characteristics on pricing power for Computers. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Log of Price Premium or Log of
Average Price Premium.
5 Conclusion
Since Akerlof’s seminal work, a number of papers have shown that when valuations depend on
the quality of goods, and the market is static, higher quality goods cannot be traded despite
the potential gains from trade. This is the well-known lemons’ problem. Recently, a number of
theoretical papers which have analyzed the existence of equilibria in dynamic markets with an
exogenous entry of traders, have shown that there also exist equilibria where all sellers can trade in
finite time. In such situations the inefficiencies caused by adverse selection manifests itself in the fact
that high quality sellers need to wait longer than low quality sellers in order to trade. However, there
has been no empirical evidence of this theory. Recent developments on Amazon and the availability
of data has made it possible to investigate these phenomena. This paper attempts to bridge that
gap by developing some hypotheses and demonstrating empirical evidence of adverse selection,
when market failure is reflected in the length of waiting time before trade occurs. Using a unique
dataset collected from the various used good markets of Amazon, across a set of five countries,
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we investigate trade patterns and trading premiums in a decentralized competitive market. This
enables us to investigate the inter-product and inter-country differences as well. While we find
substantial variations among products, we do not find any interesting differences at the country
level. A notable exception was that unlike US, UK, Canada and Germany, the book market for
France did not seem to display any evidence of adverse selection.
We find that despite the presence of both direct and indirect quality indicators such as product
and seller characteristics, the lemon’s problem is not completely alleviated on electronic secondary
markets. It manifests itself in the fact that high quality products, take a longer time to sell in the
market. This holds for a wide range of products, and thereby corroborates our predictions based on
recent theory on dynamic and decentralized markets, where goods of varying quality are available
for sale. Further, we also find evidence of the presence of adverse selection for digital cameras by
demonstrating that more reliable products will have a propensity to have lower volume of trade.
Finally, we point out that an increase in the used good price leads to higher turnaround times
for a wide range of products. Since this implies that an decrease in the used good’s transaction
price leads to a decrease in the time required for the used product to sell, we provide evidence of
our third hypothesis that goods that depreciate more quickly as reflected by a steeper decline in
their prices on the used market, have the propensity to be traded more frequently as reflected by
a smaller waiting time for trade to occur.
The existence of adverse selection has some implications for firms who are contemplating en-
tering electronic secondary markets. Since this affects high quality firms more than others, they
need to invest in technologies which do a better job in communicating reliable seller information
to buyers. This might differ across countries and so firms would need to balance market expansion
with increased costs of communication induced by asymmetric information in electronic markets.
A number of interesting extensions are possible in this domain. As internet based secondary
markets are flourishing, with more and more consumers discovering that buying used goods in
different categories such as books, CDs, Videos, Software (shrink-wrapped) and DVDs, could lead
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to significant cost savings, revenue from the commissions generated from secondhand goods (like
books, CDs, DVDs, and packaged software products) are proving to be a money-spinner for Amazon,
and it is expanding its policy of paying commissions to its affiliates to include the sale of used goods.
The emergence of these markets have raised concerns among producers such as book publishers
and authors. The ongoing heated debate between manufacturers and retailers has focussed on
the supposed damage which secondary markets established by Internet retailers are inflicting on
manufacturer profits. The general consensus is that used good sales cannibalize new good sales and
consequently are harmful to suppliers, thereby ruling out the possibility of harmonious coexistence
for all traditional players in these markets.
Amazon has argued that its electronic secondary markets actually spur new good sales. Com-
plicating this argument is the fact that for many products, such as books for example, Amazon
earns about the same from selling a new good as the commission it generates from the sale of a
used good on its marketplace. Thus, the incentives of the retailers and the manufacturers are not
aligned. However, these concerns, while theoretically possible, remain untested and many poten-
tially countervailing effects remain unexplored. Specifically, the impact of increased variety and
lower prices on consumer welfare in different product categories is not clear. An interesting exten-
sion of the work of Ghose, Smith and Telang 2005) would be to estimate the change in consumer
surplus across international secondary markets in UK, Canada, Germany, and France for electronic
devices, which also have a thriving used good market.11
Since sellers of higher quality products need to wait longer than their competitors who sell lower
quality products, they incur a cost of waiting to trade. Indeed, the cost of waiting is an important
factor that must be considered in any estimation of welfare loss caused by adverse selection. In
the context of social welfare gains from used good markets, an interesting extension would be to
investigate the cost of waiting for different sellers and different product categories in a secondary
market.
11In Appendix A, we provide a brief insight into the methodology behind this estimation.
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6 Appendix A
The nested logit framework as outlined in Berry 1994 provides a good starting point to estimate
the welfare gain for each of the following categories: Computers, Electronics and Digital Cameras,
based on the data collected from Amazon USA. Given the number of different attributes based
on which consumers make purchase decisions for these products, the characteristic space approach
would be a suitable technique in this context. Since we are able to infer the total number of used
good sales for any product category and observe the prices at which the sale occurs, we are able to
estimate the own and cross-price demand elasticities.
There exists an extensive literature which has employed a discrete choice model of differentiated
products to quantify the benefits of new products ever since Trajtenberg (1989). Fershtman and
Gandal (1998) estimate the welfare effects of the boycott of the Israeli market by a number of
automobile manufacturers. They estimate demand for automobiles during and after the boycott and
compare consumer welfare in each regime to assess the boycott’s impact. Petrin (2002) quantifies
the welfare effects of the introduction of the minivan in the US market. He first estimates demand
for automobiles, including minivans, and computes consumer welfare in this market. He then
removes minivans from the dataset and calculates counterfactual sales of all other models in the
absence of minivans. The difference in welfare between the actual and counterfactual scenario is
the welfare gain from the introduction of the minivan. A similar methodology is used by Clerides
(2004) to analyze the welfare gain from the introduction of used cars in the Cyprus auto market.
Suppose in every period each consumer chooses from the Jt+1 options the one that maximizes
his utility. If the disturbance term εjt in the utility function has the extreme value distribution,
then one can derive analytic solutions for the group shares, denoted by sg, for the market share
of product j as a fraction of the total group share sj|g, for the overall share of product j(sj), and
for the share of the outside good so. Berry (1994) showed that it is easy to derive the following
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equation that links market shares to prices, product characteristics and the within-group share:
Log(sjt)− Log(sot) = φaj + xjtβ − αpjt + σLog(sj |g, t) + ξjt. (4)
Since estimating this equation by OLS can lead to inconsistent estimates if the error term ξjt is
correlated with either the price or the within market share, We will use a instrumental variable
approach. The various instruments We can use include the sum of characteristics of other products
such as reviewer ratings or the characteristics of other firms (in this case reputation characteristics
of other sellers is also a potential instrument) or cost-side instruments under the assumption that
the demand error is uncorrelated with the instruments.







D(1−σ)g ) + C (5)
Similar to Fershtman and Gandal (1998), we can compare the actual welfare received by con-
sumers to the counterfactual scenario where there are no used goods in the market. In order to
implement the counterfactual scenario, we remove all used goods from the choice set and re-compute
market shares of new goods under this scenario. This enables us to calculate the counterfactual
welfare. The difference between the actual and counterfactual welfare is the welfare gain.
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7 Appendix B
Figure 1: A Screenshot of Amazon’s International Electronic Markets
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Figure 2: A Snapshot of Reliability Ratings for Desktops from Consumer Reports
Figure 3: A Snapshot of Reliability Ratings for Laptops from Consumer Reports
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7.1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
New Price 212705 20.16 21.71 1.95 199.99
Used Price 212705 14.14 15.19 0.99 125.9
SRating 211203 3.7 1.56 1 5
Product Condition 212705 2.63 1.1 1 5
Number of Used Offers 215423 128.15 141.78 1 951
Time 212705 12.1541 48.49 1 786
Pricepremium 212705 15.22 85.82 0 1010.94
Saleprice 212705 13.94 13.57 0.24 199.1
Table 11: Summary Statistics of Product Characteristics in the US market for Books. Summary
Statistics for CDs, DVDs and Software are also available from the author upon request.
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
NewPrice 360069 59.99 26.17 2.99 2579.99
UsedPrice 360069 15.14 40.15 0.88 1999.99
SRating 342960 4.7 0.23 2.7 5
Product Condition 360069 3.97 1.33 1 5
Number of Used Offers 360069 81.15 131.78 1 753
Time 360068 17.61 24.89 0.4 127.3
Pricepremium 360069 9.38 46.82 0.1 808.96
Saleprice 360069 15.02 40.03 0.88 1999.99
Table 12: Summary Statistics of Product Characteristics in the US market for Electronics.
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Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Listing Price 172054 24.65 26.39 0.1 513.28
Sale Price 172054 24.52 26.57 0.1 513.28
Number of Used Offers 172054 24.52 15.66 1 52.01
SRating 164950 4.27 0.21 1 5
Slife 167177 8855.44 7521.1 1 18247
Product Condition 164950 3.76 1.13 1 5
Time 172054 29.5 11.2 8 113.37
Pricepremium 172054 1.82 22.3 0 443.89
Table 13: Summary statistics of Used book market characteristics in Canada. Prices are in Cana-
dian Dollars. Summary Statistics for CDs, and DVDs are also available from the author upon
request.
Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Listing Price 152772 30.64 30.12 0.25 379.13
Sale Price 152772 30.57 30.29 0.25 379.13
Number of Used Offers 152772 34.74 19.52 1 68.55
SRating 149970 4.66 0.21 3 5
Slife 149970 18323.44 35466.22 1 222999
Product Condition 152772 4.06 1.03 1 5
Time 152772 26.19 31.36 8 138.88
Pricepremium 152772 1.81 17.93 0 257.72
Table 14: Summary statistics of Used book market characteristics in Germany. Prices are in Euros.
Summary Statistics for CDs and DVDs are also available from the author upon request.
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Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Listing Price 127125 28.57 29.12 0.95 369.31
Sale Price 127125 28.46 29.18 0.95 368.31
Number of Used Offers 127125 29.14 15.52 1 56.15
SRating 119972 4.66 0.21 3 5
Slife 119972 13238.14 25462.62 1 194882
Product Condition 127125 3.56 1.08 1 5
Time 127125 21.92 23.63 8.1 108.8
Pricepremium 127125 1.41 13.79 0 225.72
Table 15: Summary statistics of Used book market characteristics in France. Prices are in Euros.
Summary Statistics for CDs and DVDs are also available from the author upon request.
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Seller life 121474 4932.41 23788.97 1 277309
Positive Ratings (30days) 106964 89.72417 10.24237 0 100
Positive Ratings (90days) 109367 88.66753 9.235712 1 100
Positive Ratings (365 days) 111389 84.28548 10.77534 1 100
Positive Ratings (Life) 121474 84.34079 10.69533 1 100
Neutral Ratings (30days) 106964 2.56606 4.976854 0 100
Neutral Ratings (90days) 109367 2.821317 3.464281 1 100
Neutral Ratings (365days) 111389 3.925944 3.717652 1 100
Neutral Ratings (Lifetime) 121474 3.908265 3.649757 1 100
Negative Ratings (30days) 106964 7.754272 9.901006 1 100
Negative Ratings (90days) 109367 8.606911 8.452791 0 100
Negative Ratings (365days) 111389 11.64944 9.056534 0 100
Negative Ratings (Lifetime) 121474 11.62737 9.023072 0 100
TotalCount (30 days) 121474 581.643 3943.094 1 33265
TotalCount (90 days) 121474 1427.634 9686.943 1 81371
TotalCount (365 days) 121474 2427.43 12688.494 1 158137
TotalCountyr (lifetime) 121474 3551.525 24240.4 1 199747
Table 16: Summary Statistics of Seller Characteristics in the US market for Books. Summary
Statistics for four other countries and other products are omitted for brevity but available from the
author upon request.
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